this decision would have in obliterating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."° Further, this Note examines issues raised by the dissent that could have potentially impacted the Court's decision or that may have implications in the future." In addition, this Note considers that the Court imposed the rule with a purpose of increasing the ease of applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, instead of choosing a standard with exceptions that would ensure fairness and protection of the accused's rights.' 2
II. BACKGROUND

A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE BEHIND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to counsel has arisen out of two different Constitutional Amendments. 3 The right is explicitly stated in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."' 4 In addition, the right has arisen from case law interpreting the provision in the Fifth Amendment which states, "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' 5 From the beginning of the cases discussing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, there has been a tension between protecting the accused's Constitutional rights and allowing the authorities the leeway they need to investigate crimes.' 6 Throughout much of the history of the right to counsel jurisprudence, the majorities generally expanded the scope of the right to counsel to protect the rights of the accused.' 7 However, beginning in 1988, the focus of the Supreme Court switched from protecting the interests of the accused to facilitating the government's interest in investigating crimes through conversations with the suspect. 8 '0 See infra Part VI.
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. 12 Id. 13 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. Vi.
The history of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can be traced back to Massiah v. United States, which was decided in 1964.9 In that case, the petitioner and a co-defendant were charged with possession of narcotics aboard a United States vessel." 0 After being charged, the co-defendant agreed to cooperate with government agents and allowed a conversation with the petitioner to be monitored. 2 During this conversation, the petitioner made incriminating statements that were admitted in the petitioner's trial, resulting in his conviction. 22 The Court held that allowing those statements was a violation of the Sixth Amendment and that the statements should have been suppressed. 23 However, even at this early date, the dissenters were urging that the right to counsel had extended too far, since the accused was never denied access to counsel. 24 Two years later, the Supreme Court decided the most significant case to discuss the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, Miranda v. Arizona. 25 In doing so, the Court held that statements obtained from defendants who were not fully warned of their Constitutional rights were not admissible because they violated the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. 2 6 The overriding policy behind this decision was to respect the dignity and integrity of United States citizens. 27 As a consequence, if a defendant indicates to investigators that he would like to speak to an attorney, the questioning must then stop, and the defendant can refrain from answering any more questions without an attorney being present. 28 The next important case discussing the Sixth Amendment right U.S. 625 (1986). In the years between Jackson and Patterson, the composition of the Court changed, with Justices Kennedy and Scalia replacing Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, members of the dissent in Jackson, gained the new majority in Patterson with the addition of the recently appointed Justices Kennedy and Scalia, and also Justice White, who had been a member of the majority in Jackson.
to counsel was Brewer v. Williams 29 in 1977. In Brewer, the defendant was charged with abducting a child, who was still missing at the time of his arrest. 3° After his arrest and arraignment, the defendant was represented by counsel in both Davenport and Des Moines, Iowa. 31 While the defendant was being transported from Davenport to Des Moines, unaccompanied by an attorney, one of the police officers continually made remarks regarding the right of the parents to have a Christian burial for the child. 32 Because of these remarks, the deeply religious defendant 3 3 eventually made incriminating statements and led the police officers to the girl's body. 3 4 Relying on Massiah, the Supreme Court stated that Williams was entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 5 However, the issue was whether Williams voluntarily waived this right to counsel. 36 When the state court decided that Williams had waived this right, it relied on the length of time of the trip, the general circumstances, and the fact that Williams did not assert a desire not to speak without counsel. 7 However, the Supreme Court found that the supposed waiver was not an intentional relinquishment of his right to counsel and granted him a new trial. 3 The Court, however, declined to hold that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel could not be waived, only that it had not been waived in this situation. 39 Brewer was controversial, eliciting a concurrence and two separate dissents. Chief Justice Burger authored the most significant dissent and stated that, although following Massiah would suppress all evidence obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment, a blanket ex- 29 The next case dealing with the right to counsel was Edwards v. Arizona-however, this case dealt with the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. 4 3 The Court said that in order for a suspect to waive his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the waiver must be a "knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, ' 44 and the defendant must be the one to initiate the conversation or exchange with the police. 4 Although there were no dissents in Edwards, the concurring justices would not put such stringent requirements on waiver in different factual scenarios. 46 Chief Justice Burger stated that the dispositive fact in this case was that the police told the suspect he "had" to speak with the officers, and therefore his waiver was not voluntary. 47 However, Chief Justice Burger also stated that the determination of a valid, voluntary waiver depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case, "'including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."' 48 Justice Powell, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined concurring, stated he would not impose the requirement that contact be initiated by the accused in order to waive the right to counsel. 49 The Supreme Court next addressed an issue that dealt with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 1985.50 The specific issue in Maine v. Moulton was whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 40 Id. at 425-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 41 Id. at 420-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 46 See id. at 487 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("I do not agree that either any constitutional standard ... calls for a special rule as to how an accused in custody may waive the right to be free from interrogation."); see id. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating initiation could be relevant, but should not be the sine qua non).
47 Id. at 488 (Burger, C.J., concurring was violated when statements made by the defendant to a codefendant, who was cooperating with the police, were admitted at trial. 5 " The Court held that the State violated the Sixth Amendment by "knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent.,
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The incriminating statements obtained in this manner should not have been allowed into evidence. 3 In the opinion, however, the Court alluded to the offense-specific nature of the right to counsel by stating that the statements could be admitted in a prosecution for charges for which the adversary proceedings had not yet begun, but they could not be admitted in the trial for crimes that the defendant had already been charged with. 54 This case also marked some of the strongest language in support of the policy behind the right to counsel. 55 The Court stated that the average criminal does not have the professional legal skills to protect himself, 56 and therefore the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is "indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice." 57 The state thus has an affirmative obligation to respect the accused's choice to have counsel, 8 but the Sixth Amendment is not violated when the State obtains a confession by luck or coincidence. 5 9 In addition, the State's interest in gathering information should not be frustrated by the attachment of the Sixth Amendment when the defendant has not yet been charged. 6°T he dissent was authored by Chief Justice Burger, and joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor in part, 6 ' who are essentially the majority in Cobb. 6 2 They would impose a standard that, if there was a legitimate reason for the questioning of the defendant, then there would be no Sixth Amendment violation. 63 They also stated that they did not want the Sixth Amendment to unnecessarily protect criminals who are charged with multiple offenses, 64 and they did not want to broaden the right to counsel any more than it was under Massiah. 65 The very next year, the Court applied the doctrine regarding waiver from Edwards to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 66 stating that the Sixth Amendment right deserved as much protection as the right under the Fifth Amendment. 67 In Michigan v. Jackson, the Court decided that a defendant cannot waive his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment when the police initiate the conversation." In Jackson, the defendants had requested counsel at their arraignments, but the police initiated contact with them again before they were allowed to speak with their counsel. 69 The Court stated that as soon as the right to counsel attaches, counsel is assumed to be requested for every stage of the litigation. 7 " Since the right to counsel attached at their arraignments, 71 the defendants could not have waived their Sixth Amendment right to counsel during any subsequent police-initiated interrogations. 7 " The decision implies, however, that the defendant must affirmatively make a request for counsel at some point and not merely allow the right to counsel to attach to the offense. 73 Again, the same Justices who dissented in Moulton joined in a dissent that stated Edwards should not be applied to cases under the Sixth Amendment, absent evidence that police officers routinely violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 74 The dissent also states that the holding is only limited to situations where the defendant asserts his right to counsel, not situations where the right simply attaches without an assertion. 75 However, unlike the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not depend on an invoca- 64 See id. at 186.
tion by the defendant in order to attach. 76 The decision in Patterson v. Illinois in 1988 marked a shift from the Court's expansion of the right to counsel to the contraction of that right. 77 The dissenters who had been arguing for years to limit the right to counsel finally gained a majority. 78 The majority in Patterson stated that the petitioner had never asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel after his indictment. 7 9 That lack of assertion implied he made the decision not to be represented by counsel, and the statements he made to the police could be admitted at trial. 8 " Again, this is seemingly contrary to the idea in Brewer that the Sixth Amendment right attaches without an invocation by the accused. 8 The petitioner argued that he did not waive his right to counsel, but the Court said that the Miranda warnings were sufficient to alert the petitioner of his rights, and therefore the waiver was valid."
The dissents in this case, which had formerly been the majority, addressed three issues that would arise again in Cobb. 83 They first stated that since it is unethical for an attorney to contact the adversary's client without counsel in civil proceedings, the same rule should be applied in criminal proceedings. 84 They also stated that while the majority assumes that the Miranda warnings were sufficient to warn the defendant of the danger of proceeding without counsel, there are many things that an attorney can do for a client above advising him to remain silent, of which the defendant may not be aware. 85 Further, the dissent stated that the adverse party cannot ethically provide the accused with advice, particularly related to whether or not the accused should have counsel present. 8 6 The contraction of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel contin- 
LOWER COURT EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The decision in McNeil laid the foundation for the decision made in Cobb. However, in the years between McNeil and Cobb, several federal appellate courts created exceptions to the offense-specific nature of the right to counsel. 92 The two most common exceptions are that the uncharged offense was "inextricably intertwined" with the charged offense such that the right to counsel should have attached to both crimes, 93 and that the government had circumvented the right to counsel by interrogating the defendants without counsel present. 9 4
The first exception arose out of Brewer where the Court implicitly used it in order to suppress statements regarding a murder when the defendant had only been charged with an abduction. 95 deciding when to apply the exception was highly factualized, depending on the circumstances relating to the conduct involved, the identity of the persons involved and the timing, motive, and location of the crimes. 96 The second exception, commonly termed "circumventing the Sixth Amendment," has also been considered in courts of appeals cases. 97 The "circumventing the Sixth Amendment" exception applies when there is "evidence of deliberate police misconduct in the process of eliciting the incriminating statements." 98 Many courts have not had the occasion to consider this exception, however, since they have relied primarily on the "closely related" exception. 99 C. THE DEFINITION OF "OFFENSE"
The Supreme Court had its first opportunity, in Cobb, to consider what constitutes an "offense" for the purposes of right to counsel." 0 The Supreme Court had considered this issue in terms of double jeopardy, but not the right to counsel."°' In the double jeopardy context, the Court applies the test from Blockburger v. United States, which states, "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied ... is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." ' 2 In Blockburger, the Court found that although there was only one transaction (a drug sale), that sale constituted a violation of two statutory sections and, therefore, there were two offenses.' 3 III. STATEMENT from the Owings, regarding the burglary and disappearances." 5 Cobb denied any knowledge of, or involvement, in either the burglary or the disappearances. 0 6 In July 1994, Cobb was under arrest for an unrelated offense. 0 7 At that time, the police questioned him again with respect to the incident at the Owings'." 8 Cobb then gave a written statement confessing to the burglary but continued to deny any involvement in the disappearance of Margaret and Kori Rae. 9 Cobb was subsequently indicted for only the burglary charge."'
In August 1994, Hal Ridley was appointed to represent Cobb on the burglary charge."' Following his appointment as Cobb's counsel, investigators asked Ridley for permission to question Cobb regarding the disappearances." 2 At that time, Cobb was not a suspect in the murders, but the police believed he knew more than he was telling." 3 Ridley gave his permission to the police and stated that it was not necessary for him to be there." 4 This situation occurred again in September 1995."' Throughout this entire time frame, Cobb continued to deny any involvement in the disappearances." 6 In November 1995, Cobb was free on bond and living with his father in Odessa, Texas." 7 On November 11, Charles Cobb, Raymond's father, contacted the Walker County Sheriffs Office and stated that his son had confessed to killing Margaret and Kori Rae during the burglary." 8 Cobb's father gave a statement to that effect to the police in Odessa, through which they obtained a warrant for Cobb's arrest." 9 On November 12, the detectives arrested Cobb The officers did not find the murder weapon there, but did find numerous other knives, newspaper articles about the disappearances, Walt Disney videos alleged to be stolen from the Owings, and Margaret's wedding band.' 26 Around 9 a.m. that same morning, Cobb was arraigned in Odessa on capital murder charges. 2 He was then flown to Walker County and arraigned again in the airport there.' 28 After arriving in Walker County, Cobb led the police to the place where the victims' bodies were buried.' 29 Cobb was then taken to jail and booked. 30 During that time, Cobb never indicated that he wanted to speak with an attorney, nor that he was represented by an attorney on the burglary charge."' Later that evening, the Walker County District Attorney contacted Ridley to tell him about Cobb's confession and capture. 3 2 Although conflict in the record exists, either that same evening or the next evening the investigators contacted Ridley and asked him if it would be okay to take Cobb back to the murder site, to which Ridley agreed. 33 On November 14, Ridley came to the jail to help Cobb with emotional problems and shortly thereafter he was appointed as Cobb's counsel on the murder charge.' 34 V. PROCEDURAL HISTORY During Cobb's lower court trial, he made a motion to suppress his confession as being obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment, which the trial court denied.' 35 Cobb was subsequently convicted of capital murder for murdering more than one person in the course of a single criminal transaction and sentenced to death.' 36 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Cobb's conviction and remanded for a new trial on the basis that the murder conviction was "factually interwoven" with the burglary, and therefore the right to counsel had attached when Cobb accepted Ridley as his counsel on the burglary charge.' 37 The court stated that "once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely related factually to the offense charged."' 3 Since the murder was so interwoven with the burglary, the right to counsel had attached to that crime as well, even though Cobb had not yet been charged.' 39 They also held that Cobb had asserted his right to counsel when he accepted Ridley as his counsel on the burglary charge. 4° Therefore, the introduction of Cobb's confession during the trial was not harmless error.""
The dissent in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case, however, thought that Cobb was distinguishable from Michigan v. Jack-son because Cobb had waived his right to counsel before confessing."' They stated Cobb's waiver was valid, unlike the waiver in Jackson, because it was given seventeen months after he was charged with the first crime,' 43 Cobb did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel,' and the State repeatedly received permission from Cobb's attorney to question him. 45 The State sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. 146 There were three issues in front of the Court on certiorari:
(1) whether the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel attached only to charged offenses and not to uncharged, but "factually related" offenses; (2) whether Cobb made a valid unilateral waiver of his right to counsel in this case; and (3) what test was used to determine whether an uncharged offense is the same as the charged offense. 47 Since the Court determined the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached to the uncharged 6ffenses, the Court did not consider whether Cobb waived his right to counsel in this case. 14 8
V. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS A. MAJORITY OPINION
The case was decided in the Supreme Court by a 5-4 decision.' 49 Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion 5° The Supreme Court, relying on McNeil v. Wisconsin, held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific, in that the right only attaches to charged offenses and not to uncharged offenses that are factually related to the charged offense." 5 ' Moreover, it held that when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it encompasses offenses that would be considered the same offense under the Block-142 Id. at -10-*11. 143 Id. at *11 (interrogation in Jackson occurred shortly after the request for counsel, here it occurred seventeen months later).
144 Id. The court said accepting counsel at an arraignment is not an unequivocal assertion to the right to counsel. Id. at n. 11.
145 Id. at *I I (stating the interrogations over the seventeen month period amounted to a waiver The Court held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offensespecific and only attaches to a charged offense.' 53 However, many lower courts have read an exception into this rule that allows the right to attach to crimes that are "factually related" to a charged offense.' 54 Specifically in this case, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals used this exception to say that Cobb's right to counsel for the murder attached at the time of arraignment for the burglary. 5 This exception has grown out of its implicit use in Brewer v. Williams and Maine v. Moulton; however, the Court refused to rely on this because Brewer and Moulton did not address the specific question.' 56 in addition, the Court pointed to a phrase in Moulton that refers to the offensespecific nature of the right to counsel as supporting the public interest in investigating crimes.' 57 The Court in Moulton stated, "[tlo exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at the time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities."' 5 8 Thus, in order to promote the public interest, the Court saw no reason to read an exception into the offensespecific rule of the Sixth Amendment.' 59 The Court rejected the argument raised by Cobb that the offense-specific rule would invade a suspect's constitutional rights by allowing police officers wide discretion to conduct investigations and to use uncounseled interrogations in those investigations. 60 To support this position, the Court stated that the suspect must be informed of his rights against compulsory self-incrimination and right to counsel before a custodial interrogation.' 6 The Court also stated that even a suspect's Constitutional rights do not negate the public interest in allowing police to talk to witnesses and suspects, even if they have been charged with other offenses. 6 ' The overriding public interest is "finding, convicting and punishing those who violate the law," and the type of confession the police obtained from Cobb is essential to promoting that interest. 164 After deciding that the Sixth Amendment right was indeed offense-specific, the Court then turned to considering what would actually be considered the same offenses.' 65 The Court realized that the definition of offense is not necessarily limited to the "four comers of a charging instrument."' 66 In doing so, the Court relied on the definition in Blockburger which described the same offense in terms of double jeopardy.' 67 The Court stated "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two or more distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."' 68 The Court saw no reason why the definition of same offense in the context of double jeopardy was any different than the definition in Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases.' 69 Applying this reasoning to the facts in Cobb [Vol. 93 questionable.' 72 The justices believed that Edwards and Miranda were sufficient to protect the accused's right to counsel. 73 According to Edwards and Miranda, the accused must unambiguously assert that he was invoking his right to counsel, and the concurrence states the right should not apply unless the accused makes that assertion.' 74 However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches independently of the accused's expressed request, regardless of any expressed intent of the accused to remain silent." 5 The concurring Justices found this rule questionable.' 76 If Jackson applied in this situation, Cobb would not have been allowed to voluntarily waive his right to counsel. 7 However, if Jackson should only be applied where a suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel, as the concurring Justices believed, Jackson did not apply in this case, since Cobb did not unambiguously assert this right.' 78 Therefore, the concurring Justices believed that Cobb validly waived his right to counsel by voluntarily choosing to speak to the police.' 79 C. DISSENT The four-member dissent was authored by Justice Breyer. 8°T he dissent stated that the definition of same offense used by the majority was too technical and undermined the protections of the Sixth Amendment.' 8 ' Although they felt that Cobb's charged and uncharged offenses were sufficiently related to require the presence of counsel at his confession,' the dissenting justices did not urge that the right to counsel attaches to every crime the accused committed.' 83 Instead, they urged that some limits must still be enforced.' 84 The dissenters believed that once a suspect asserts his need for counsel, he should not be forced to make a critical legal choice without the assistance of counsel.' 85 By asserting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the suspect has shown that he "does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly."' 86 This would include being capable of choosing whether to speak to prosecutors without an attorney present. 87 Although the concurrence stated that Jackson does not allow for a defendant to give his own account of the events that occurred, the dissent believed that nothing stops the defendant from initiating contact with the police. ' 8 When the defendant is the one to initiate the contact with the police, the protections of the Sixth Amendment can be waived.' 89 The dissent also stated that due to the fact that criminal codes in many states are extremely detailed, it is easy to find overlapping offenses that may arise out of a single transaction, thus allowing the police to question the suspect on any number of the uncharged offenses without notifying counsel. 9 ' The dissent used a simple hypothetical to illustrate how an armed robbery, for instance, can result in at least four different offenses. 19 ' The dissent also noted that, although the majority relied on Brewer and Moulton, if those cases had been decided after Cobb, they would have had different outcomes.' 92 For example, in Moulton, the defendant was charged with burglary and theft.' 9 3 If the Blockburger test were to apply, those would be considered separate offenses, and the conviction on the initial charged offense would have been overturned. '9"
The dissent also stated that the Blockburger test is difficult to administer in practice, yet the majority's decision now forces police officers, as opposed to lawyers and judges, to apply this test before 190 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 191 Id. (According to the majority, an armed robber who reaches across a store counter and grabs a cashier while threatening the cashier's life could potentially be charged with the separate offenses of "armed robbery, assault, battery, trespass, use of a firearm to commit a felony and perhaps possession of a firearm by a felon.").
192 Id. at 183-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 193 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) . 194 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 93 questioning suspects.' Therefore, the dissent urged an adoption of the alternative that would define an offense in terms of the conduct of a particular occasion and would include acts that are "closely related to" or "inextricably intertwined with" the charged offense, using the standards applied in the lower courts as a guideline. 196 
VI. ANALYSIS
In Cobb, the Court decided that the defendant's right to counsel had not attached as to the uncharged murder.' 9 7 Although this decision is well-supported by precedent,' 98 the Court failed to recognize the overall effect this will have on obliterating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' 9 9 The Court opted to use a rule that purportedly increased the ease of administration instead of a standard that ensured fairness and the protection of the accused's rights."' 0 In addition, the Court did not consider some issues that potentially could have impacted their decision." 0 ' These issues include the "circumventing the Sixth Amendment" exception to the right to counsel and possible protections afforded by the no-contact ethics rule for attorneys. 02
A. THE DECISION MADE IN COBB BLURS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND DIMINISHES THE ADDED PROTECTIONS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT.
Before considering the effect of the Cobb decision on Sixth Amendment case law, it is necessary to examine the differences between the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment and under the' Sixth Amendment. To begin, the purposes behind the rights differ. 20 3 The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right is to protect the accused during confrontations with his "expert adversary," the government, during the prosecution of the alleged crime, whereas the purpose of 195 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) the Fifth Amendment right is to protect the suspect's desire to deal with police only through counsel. 2 " 4 The Fifth Amendment right to counsel was first established in Miranda v. Arizona, where the Court held that suspects had the right to counsel during custodial interrogations," 5 but the right could be waived if the suspect "knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. 20 6 The right cannot be waived, though, if the police initiate contact with the accused after he has requested counsel, since the suspect's statements are then presumed to be involuntary and are inadmissible. 20 7 The most important distinction between the Fifth Amendment right to counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is that the Fifth Amendment right is not offense-specific; therefore once the suspect invokes this right, officers cannot approach him regarding any offense without counsel present. 20 8 The right was created to "counteract the inherent pressures of custodial interactions."" 2 9 In addition, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel does not attach automatically, it requires some affirmative statement by the defendant that can be construed as an expression of desire for counsel "in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police." 2 '
In contrast, the Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific. 2 1 ' As such, the right does not attach until the beginning of the adversary proceedings, whether that be a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment or arraignment. 2 12 Therefore, when the accused makes incriminating statements with respect to crimes for which he has not been formally charged, those statements are admissible at a trial of those offenses. 2 " 3 Once the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment has been invoked, however, the right cannot be waived by the accused during a police-initiated conversation. 2 4 In different respects, each right is somewhat broader and narrower than the other. 215 The Fifth Amendment right is narrower than the Sixth Amendment right since it applies only in custodial interrogations, whereas the Sixth Amendment right applies at every stage of the prosecution. 216 However, the Fifth Amendment right is broader in the sense that it applies to questioning regarding any offense by the accused without requiring the beginning of adversary proceedings.
17
The Sixth Amendment right only applies to crimes for which the defendant has been charged. 21 8 Further, invoking one right does not necessarily trigger the other right, since a suspect may be willing to speak with police in the absence of counsel about crimes unrelated to the charged offense. 1 9
The decision in Cobb further limits the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 22° and places suspects and their attorneys in a precarious position l .
22
Following Cobb, suspects are no longer protected from questioning regarding offenses which may have occurred at the same time as a charged offense, but for which the suspects have not been charged.
Since many suspects are unsophisticated, they will likely not realize the distinctions between the different rights to counsel. 223 This places a heavy burden on the attorney to inform his client that he must unequivocally reassert his Fifth Amendment right to counsel in every discussion with the police, so that he will not be questioned regarding related offenses. 224 The defendant would not be allowed to invoke his Sixth Amendment right with respect to other crimes, because those crimes have not been charged yet. 225 However, the protection of the Fifth Amendment assertion will only protect the suspect in custodial interrogations. 2 6 If the defendant is approached in any other non-custodial setting without counsel present regarding an uncharged offense, he will not have any protection under either the Sixth Amendment 227 or the Fifth Amendment. 228 There appear to be several reasons why the facts in Cobb were more susceptible to a limitation of the Sixth Amendment. A long period of time passed between the charging of the first crime and the confession, making it less likely the suspect was in contact with counsel regarding that offense. 29 Further, it was Cobb who initiated the confession process by confessing to his father, and he did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. 23 If he had remained silent and was approached by the police for questioning regarding the murder, the case may have turned out differently. However, in this case, Cobb and his attorney had repeatedly waived his right to counsel during questioning regarding the burglary and murder.' Lastly, murder and burglary are very distinct offenses, especially under the Blockburger test. 232 However, the majority did not consider the ramifications of their decision with respect to charged and uncharged offenses that are described more similarly in the criminal codes. 233 Since criminal codes are very lengthy and detailed, there are now increased chances of finding overlapping offenses arising out of one transaction. 234 The dissent presents several scenarios where conduct such as an armed robbery, drug sale, or protest could produce several related of- .J., dissenting) . 230 See id. 231 See id. 232 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 174 (2001) (Burglary requires "entry into or continued concealment in a building," while capital murder requires "murder of more than one person during a criminal transaction."). 233 See id. at 173-74 (applying the Blockburger rule to Cobb without discussion of why this may be appropriate in Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases or cases with differing facts). 234 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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fenses. 2 35
This creates the unlimited potential for authorities to charge a suspect with one aspect of the crime, such as assault, and then conduct questioning of the suspect outside of counsel with respect to a battery charge. 236 Any information gained from the defendant can then be used in a trial on the battery charge. 237 The majority in Cobb downplays the impact that the decision will have on the Constitutional rights of the suspects by stating that no "parade of horribles," such as law enforcement officials with unlimited ability to conduct interrogations without counsel present, "has occurred in those jurisdictions that have not enlarged upon McNeiL, 2 3 ' However, following the decision in Cobb, there is now evidence that the police manipulation feared by the dissent is exactly what is going to occur. 39 In July 2001, the FBI's Law Enforcement Bulletin contained an article advocating "creative charging" by law enforcement officials as a means of taking full advantage of the limited protections afforded to suspects under the Sixth Amendment. 24°S uch creative techniques would include charging the defendant with one crime while continuing to investigate other related crimes and using a cellmate informant to question a suspect on uncharged offenses. 21 These are the identical tactics that the Cobb dissent warned against as undermining the attorney-client relationship and removing the protections of the Sixth Amendment. 242 The Cobb decision is a strict departure from earlier case law recognizing the strong policy of protecting the rights of the accused. 243 The Court had previously worried that the increased ability of police officers to manipulate the Sixth Amendment would eviscerate the 235 See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). A drug sale could constitute possession of drugs, conspiring to sell drugs, being under the influence of drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia, among other things. A protestor could potentially be charged with trespass, failing to disperse and unlawful assembly. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 236 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting 241 Id. 242 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 181 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 243 See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (stating average criminals do not have professional legal skills to protect themselves, and right to counsel is necessary for the fair administration ofjustice system). right to counsel. 244 The Court had also stated that all doubts regarding waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim. 245 However, the decision in Cobb places the interests of the police in investigating crimes above the interests of the accused. 246 Allowing this situation to occur exploits the vulnerability of the defendant, 247 who does not have the requisite legal skills to protect himself. 248 It also overrides the purpose behind the Sixth Amendment to "protect the unaided layman at critical confrontations" with his "expert adversary, ' '249 since now the defendant can be questioned during those "critical confrontations" without counsel present. 2 50 Finally, the majority's decision will decrease the effectiveness of a lawyer's role as a "medium" between the suspect and the government 2 51 by removing the buffer of an attorney in questioning regarding uncharged offenses. 5 2
B. THE COURT GIVES NO JUSTIFICATION FOR APPLYING BLOCKBURGER IN SIXTH AMENDMENT CASES, EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT LOWER COURTS WERE UNABLE TO APPLY THE "FACTUALLY RELATED" EXCEPTION.
As discussed in many lower court cases, 2 3 there has been an exception to the offense-specific nature of the Sixth Amendment for "factually related" or "inextricably intertwined" offenses. 254 In these situations, the government may not question a suspect regarding 244 charge of transporting illegal immigrants when the defendants had only been charged by the state with kidnapping, because the offenses were "inextricably intertwined").
crimes that are closely related to the charged crime, without the presence of counsel. 255 If a suspect is questioned regarding these crimes and subsequently confesses, those confessions are inadmissible at trial. 56 In determining whether offenses are closely related, the courts consider all the facts and circumstances related to the offenses. 25 7 This includes the place, time and people involved in the crimes, as well as the motive behind the crime; however, none of these factors are dispositive."' In addition, crimes have been found to be unrelated where the acts were separated by time, location or other circumstances .2" For example, in Commonwealth v. Rainwater, the defendant was charged with a theft that occurred on September 10, however, after his arraignment he was questioned and confessed to thefts that had taken place earlier in the year. 26 The court found that even though the same three people were involved in all the crimes, the offenses were not "inextricably intertwined," since they occurred at different times. 2 6 ' This fact-based inquiry has been applied in many cases, and the courts that have applied it show no difficulty in doing so. 2 62 In addition, this "closely related" test furthers the policies behind the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by allowing the defendant a fair trial. The Cobb dissent realizes that this test is not perfect, however, the application is rooted in common sense, which they assert makes it easier to apply. 264 Instead of adopting this test, however, the majority, in essence, abolished the exception by applying the factors of the Blockburger test instead.
The Blockburger test arose in context of double jeopardy and has never been applied in the right to counsel cases. 6 The Cobb majority did not elaborate on their reasons for deciding to apply Block- Chief Justice Rehnquist has also elaborated on the purposes behind the Double Jeopardy clause, 2 69 but those purposes differ significantly from the purposes behind the right to counsel. The primary purposes behind the Double Jeopardy clause are to "protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal ... after a conviction.., and against multiple punishments for the same offense." 27 However, the purpose behind the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to protect the defendant in confrontations with his adversary during the criminal prosecution. 27 ' While the purposes of the Double Jeopardy clause turn on the definition of "same offense," ' 272 the purpose behind the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not mention the same offense. 27 3
Throughout legal discussions, it has been pointed out that "the tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them ... has all the tenacity of original sin and should be guarded against. ' 274 The Supreme Court in Cobb did not "guard against" this fallacy when deciding to apply Blockburger to the Sixth Amendment context without addressing the differing purposes behind the right to counsel and double jeopardy.
The Blockburger test is also not as simple to administer as the majority seems to believe. 275 In addition, the author of the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, has described the Blockburger test in the double jeopardy context as a "veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator.
2 ' 78 As the dissent realizes, however, now police officers and investigators will be asked to apply this test to each particular case, instead of having legal professionals decide. 279 This situation creates the possibility of increased litigation regarding this issue.
The Supreme Court's decision is additionally puzzling due to the fact that two of the foundational cases would likely have turned out differently if decided after Cobb. 28 In crafting the "inextricably interwoven" exception, the lower courts relied on the implicit use of this exception in Brewer v. Williams and Maine v. Moulton. 282 In Moulton, the defendant was first charged with theft, then made incriminating statements, and was then charged with burglary. 2 83 The Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, which had remanded the case for a new trial on both counts because the incriminating statements were allowed at trial. 284 However, under the Maine statutes, the crimes of burglary and theft each required proof of different facts. 2 Although the Court considered the "inextricably intertwined" exception to the offense-specific nature of the right to counsel, the Court has not yet had the opportunity to consider the "circumventing the Sixth Amendment" exception. 292 This exception applies when "the government breach[es] its 'affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel." 293 Since many lower courts ended up applying the "inextricably intertwined" exception, they have not had as much opportunity to apply the "circumventing the Sixth Amendment exception., 2 94 However, since the "inextricably intertwined" exception no longer exists after Cobb, it is possible that courts may still rely on the "circumventing the Sixth Amendment" exception.
If lower courts and the Supreme Court decide to apply this exception in the future, the types of situations the dissent warns against, such as charging a suspect with only one offense, but questioning him regarding related ones, can be avoided." 5 Although it is not nearly as protective of the accused's rights as the "inextricably intertwined" exception, it may keep the Sixth Amendment right to counsel from being eviscerated, because it will apply in situations where the police officers are specifically trying to avoid dealing with the suspect through counsel. 296 For example, the encouragement of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin to use "creative charging" to circumvent the limited protections of the amendment could be considered one such prohibited situation. 297 Further protection for the accused may be afforded by the nocontact ethics rule. 29 As provided by Rule 4.2 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "in representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
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Although this rule is examined for potential applicability in Massiah, the Court determined that it only applies to attorneys and not investigators and therefore should not be applied in this context. 0 The main protection afforded by the no-contact rule is to protect the litigant from having to deal with the legal skill and knowledge of the opposing lawyer. 31 That purpose is not served when the person doing the questioning is a police officer with no legal skill. 2 The dissent in Patterson states that the same notions of fairness apply in the criminal context that apply in the civil context, but the dissent does not address the fact that investigators will be conducting the questioning. 33 tion is strengthened by the recent passage of the "McDade Bill," 30 6 which imposes the same ethical rules on prosecutors that it does on any other attorney. 7 However, the Court that addressed this issue realized that often the contact between a prosecutor and a suspect will be "authorized by law." 3 8 Only in severe cases will the prosecutor violate the no-contact rule. 30 9 In one sense, this protection is even broader than the Sixth Amendment because it applies prior to indictment. 3 "' However, the ethical rules are not applicable to the officers who conduct investigations, such as in Cobb. Therefore, the protections afforded to the accused are not great enough to ensure the continued protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for all suspects.
VII. CONCLUSION
In determining that the right to counsel is offense-specific and that there is no exception for "factually related" offenses, the Supreme Court continued its trend of contracting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 311 Since suspects do not need to be represented by counsel with respect to closely related crimes, there is now ample opportunity for police officers to manipulate the charges brought against suspects in order to gain evidence admissible at trial. 312 In fact, this method has already been advocated in at least one context. 3 13 Further, the litigation on this issue will likely continue as police officers are now forced to apply the Blockburger test in determining which offenses can be considered the same offense. 3 14 The majority did not discuss why this test is applicable in the right to counsel context, and previous litigation has indicated that this test is not as simple as the majority would indicate."' In contrast, applying the
